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Abstract—The integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) and
Blockchains (BC) for trusted and decentralized approaches
enabled modern use cases, such as supply chain tracing, smart
cities, and IoT data marketplaces. For these it is essential to
identify reliably IoT devices, since the producer-consumer trust
is not guaranteed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Therefore, this
work proposes a Know Your IoT device platform (KYoT), which
enables the self-sovereign identification of IoT devices on the
Ethereum BC. KYoT permits manufacturers and device owners
to register and verify IoT devices in a self-sovereign fashion, while
data storage security is ensured. KYoT deploys an SRAM-based
(Static Random Access Memory) Physically Unclonable Function
(PUF), which takes advantage of the manufacturing variability
of devices’ SRAM chips to derive a unique identifying key for
each IoT device. The self-sovereign identification mechanism
introduced is based on the ERC 734 and ERC 735 Ethereum
identity standards.
Index Terms—Self-sovereign Identification, Physically Unclon-
able Function PUF, Ethereum, Blockchains, Smart Contract
I. INTRODUCTION
For many IoT use cases data security is key. Therefore, IoT
data transmission security is required, where a typical solution
encrypts data with a secret key, which is often preserved
in a non-volatile storage. However, this is susceptible to
possible attacks, where an unauthorized retrieval of the secret
key could occur [17]. To overcome such vulnerabilities, this
paper exploits IoT devices’ hardware characteristics, which are
physically unrepeatable and represent a unique construction
of hardware as well as its material used. Thus, such an
identification of IoT devices can ensure the origin of data.
Proposed methods exist utilizing hardware’s unique char-
acteristics for identification, i.e., Physically Unclonable Func-
tions (PUF) [7]. PUFs study on small variations in the charac-
teristics of Integrated Circuits (IC) of IoT devices to derive
unique keys based on the individual characteristics of this
IC, thus, enabling secret key generation without the need for
storage in a non-volatile memory [12]. This is due to the fact
that the PUF-generated key can be generated on the fly, while
the PUF output will remain the same. The PUF-generated
key acts like a hardware’s DNA. PUF-based solutions take
IC characteristics as input and produce a key that is unique
to that IC given. A valid and reliable PUF produces the same
key for the same IC with a high probability and must, within
reason, produce a different key for each new IC.
While a large number of IoT hardwares exist, this work
utilizes Arduino (e.g., Arduino Mega2560 or Arduino Uno) [1]
devices. Three pools of memory are used in the microcon-
troller on AVR-based Arduino boards [4], i.e., (i) flash mem-
ory (program space), storing the Arduino sketch, (ii) SRAM
(Static Random Access Memory) for the sketch to create and
manipulate variables at run-time, and (iii) EEPROM, memory
to store long-term information. The SRAM is volatile and data
is lost when the power is turned off. The ATmega2560 is the
hardware used in this work has an SRAM of 8 kByte [4].
The manufacturing variability of SRAMs causes small mis-
matches between N-channel and P-channel transistors, which
results in individual SRAM cells having a bias toward 0 or
1, upon powering on. Since these cells’ values are mostly
consistent for each power cycle, they determine the physical
characteristic for that chip. Therefore, the start-up values of
SRAM bits are used as input for a PUF [17]. Utilizing this
attribute with the Arduino SRAM leads to the design and
implementation of the Know Your IoT device platform (KYoT)
for the identification of Arduino-based IoT devices.
KYoT aims to enforce a reliable approach for self-sovereign
identity management based on the Ethereum Blockchain (BC)
identity standards [6], [20], [21]. This approach ensures each
device is represented on the BC by a Smart Contract (SC).
Since SCs are autonomous distributed applications running
on Ethereum network, they manage a set of peers based on
predefined rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents background and related work followed by the
design and implementation description of KYoT in Section
III and IV. Sections V and VI discuss the KYoT’s approach
and contain a brief summary.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The design and implementation of KYoT involves a range
of areas, especially IoT, BCs, self-sovereign identity manage-
ment, SCs, identity standards of the Ethereum BC.
A. Background
BCs operate on the basis of (a) a Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
network protocol, (b) a copy of the distributed ledger per
node, and (c) minors, validators, and BC clients providing
an immutable, distributed data storage via consensus mecha-
nisms deployed. The consensus mechanism is a decentralized
and trusted principle-set providing the global agreement. An
example is the Proof-of-Work (PoW) [8].
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) were initiated
as “Silicon Physical Random" Functions [12]. Different im-
plementations of circuits identified authenticated individual
ICs using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). [14]
proposed the use of the power-up state of SRAMs as a
fingerprint. [17] investigated this approach as a PUF for a
chip identification. The manufacturing process of SRAMs
[17] showed that the ATMega 1284p microcontroller contains
sufficient entropy to uniquely identify each chip based on
its power-up state. Initially, error rates i.e., the number of
SRAM cells behaving fully random of SRAM PUFs, are too
high to be used for applications such as key generation and
authentication. Without utilizing an error correction approach,
the PUF output would be useless or hard to be regenerated
equally. One such an approach is using a ”Fuzzy Extractor"
explained as follows.
Fuzzy Extractors were proposed as a primitive to extract
nearly uniform randomness from noisy data in order to se-
curely authenticate biometric data [10]. The primitive can be
applied to information that is not reproducible precisely and
is not distributed uniformly. The output of fuzzy extractors is
error-tolerant, thus, the same output is produced for input data
that is slightly variant, as long as the differences stay within
a margin.
Ethereum Identity Standards exist to define the identity
of users and devices. ERC 734 describes standard functions for
uniquely identifiable proxy SCs that can be used by other ac-
counts or SCs. These SCs describe "anything", such as groups
of individuals or devices, and act as an identity proxy on the
BC. The described identity SC has a key-storage controlling
the degree to which other parties can interact with the contract.
E.g., upon creation of the contract, a management key is added
to the key-storage based on the creator’s account address to
ensure that certain functionality can only be executed by the
SC creator. The contract also features an execute function to
run arbitrary contract calls, which acts as a proxy for whatever
instance it is representing [6]. ERC 735 extends these functions
to add and remove claims, which are hashed and signed by
an identity contract of a trusted third party. In order to issue
claims, this contract must first add a claim key to its key-
storage, as it will be used to sign the claim and will be later
checked by anyone wishing to check, if the claim is valid [20].
B. BC and PUF Solutions for IoT
Major state-of-the-art BC and PUF-based solutions for IoT
identification are elaborated in [18]. While the comparison of
related work and KYoT (cf. Table I) shows major differences,
PUFs used to identify IoT devices were introduced by [9] via
an identity-based cryptosystem to enable a secure authentica-
tion and message encryption between IoT devices. IoT devices
run an enrolment procedure, where each node saves its PUF-
derived Challenge Response Pair (CRP) in a database hosted
by a server node in the IoT network. Upon a communication
demand, the server node authenticates them by checking the
newly generated PUF data matching the CRPs stored.
[22] proposed a concept to uniquely link physical devices to
logical addresses on the BC in order to protect IoT transactions
by using Identification Random Access Memory (IDRAM) as
a replacement chip for the RAM built into devices to facilitate
physical chip identification. [13] utilizes for an authentication
scheme SRAM PUFs to generate digital fingerprints, deploy-
ing public and private BCs, thus, manufacturers register de-
vices before selling them. [15] combines PUFs with Ethereum
SCs to ensure data provenance and data integrity in IoT
environments. Authentications are handled by SCs deployed
acting as trusted servers. Devices publish the CRP from their
PUF implementation to this contract to register themselves.
Whenever authentication is necessary, transactions are due by
the device, the server contract initiates the verification process.
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF RELATED WORK
Approach PUF BC Use Case’s Focus






[13] SRAM PUF Not specified Periodic Identification
[15] Not specified Ethereum Authentication
Message encryption
[16] Various Ethereum Device Integrity
within supply chain




KYoT’s design is multidimensional. It maps devices to users
hence, it includes a Know-Your-Costumer (KYC), a Know-
Your-Device (KYD), a PUF algorithm, and smart contracts
all integrated in one package. The following presents these
dimensions by elaborating on the design details of each.
A. Device Verification:
The process of verifying a device on the KYoT server is
comprised of two stages: (a) registering devices before a user
gets access to a device – done by the manufacturer – and (b)
a device buyer and owner registering of a device on KYoT.
This step requires a unique identifier already received with
the purchase of a device. Once successfully registered, the
user can proceed to verify her/his device (cf. Figure 1).
As a verified presence of an IoT device on the Ethereum
BC is key, interactions with other accounts and SCs on the
network show parties trusting the device’s identity. To ensure
that the device is linked to a device owner with a verified
presence on the BC, KYoT deploys Ethereum SCs handling
identities based on ERC 734 combined with ERC 735 [2], [3].
B. KYC Claim
Figure 2 shows the steps required to deploy and set-up all
SCs, including the user’s verification: The user deploys an
identity SC to the Ethereum BC. The required management
key is automatically added upon the creation of the SC. This


















Fig. 1. KYoT Design — Device Verification Processes
devices. KYoT implements the user’s registration (via KYC)
and the device registration (via KYD) processes. The user has
to send the data required to be verified to the KYC service,
which will process this verification request. This claim is
added to the user’s deployed identity SC, at which point the
user’s identity will be considered as "verified".
If the user chooses to add a device, the user must add a
claim key to the identity SC, as this will be required to sign
ownership claims for devices, effectively linking devices to the
device owner. Subsequently, the user deploys an identity SC
for this device, signs an ownership claim, and adds it to the
newly created proxy SC. At this point, KYoT has successfully
added proxy instances of the user and all devices to the BC,
as well as verified the user’s identity.
C. KYD Claim
To identify devices added (cf. Figure 3) the device must run
the verification process. If the KYD platform deems the device
to be valid, its proxy SC signs the KYD claim. As with other
claims, the device’s identity SC adds this claim and shows that
it was verified by the KYD. If other SCs or accounts on the BC
want to ensure that the identity of this device is verified, they
can check, if its identity SC includes a signed KYD claim,
which also provides information on the issuer.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Specification of KYoT implementation considering the main
steps users have to follow for a successful interaction with
KYoT’s KYD and KYC processes are presented as follows


















Fig. 2. Deployment and Set-Up of Identity SCs for a User/Device
A. User Registration
Upon a user sign-in for the first time, the registration process
is needed and includes interactions with the Web Application
(App), the BC, and the KYD server. The interaction with the
Ethereum BC is handled by the KYoT’s Web App. KYoT’s
Web App uses the provider injected by the MetaMask [5]
extension to interact with the BC. This is done on a user’s
behalf and has its separate identity SC for the KYD signed
by the KYC and KYD claims. Assuming KYoT users are
primarily connected to their Ethereum account using the
MetaMask browser extension, the sign-in page automatically
launches a MetaMask pop-up, where the user can sign in and
subsequently approve account access. The next step requires
the user to fill in a form displayed on the user registration page.
It includes all fields necessary for the user creation request.
1 / / Deploys an i d e n t i t y s m a r t c o n t r a c t from a c c o u n t s [ 0 ] .
2 c o n s t r e s u l t = a w a i t new t h i s . web3 . e t h . C o n t r a c t ( a b i )
3 . d ep l o y ( { d a t a : b y t e c o d e } )
4 . send ( { from : a c c o u n t s [ 0 ] , gas : 3000000 } ) ;
5 / / Adds a c l a i m key t o t h e d e p l o y e d SC .
6 a w a i t r e s u l t . methods . addKey (
7 t h i s . web3 . u t i l s . keccak256 ( r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s ) , 3 ,
1
8 ) . send ( { from : a c c o u n t s [ 0 ] , gas : 3000000 } ) ;
Listing 1. SC Deployment for a User Within the Web App’s User Service
The next step deploys a proxy SC representing the user
on the Ethereum BC. To do this, the form data gathered
in the previous step is passed to the register function of
the user.service in the Web application. The injected
Web3 instance is used to deploy a plain version of the
Identity.sol SC to the BC (cf. Listing 1). The second
block of code covers the adding of a claim key to the newly
created SC. The key is derived from the SC address using
a hash function. This key is required later for the issuing of















Fig. 3. Issuing a KYD Claim in KYoT
Once these interactions with the BC are approved from the
account owner via Metamask, the proxy SC is deployed for
the user on the BC and it is ready for adding devices. As one
of the benefits of linking devices to a user is accountability,
the user needs to be a verified entity that could be held
accountable for wrongdoings. Thus, a KYC claim is added to
the SC, if the user successfully identifies himself. This process
is implemented by filling out a registration form [2], [3].
Listing 2 shows the signing of the KYC claim and adding
it to the user’s identity SC. The first block of code creates
data included in the claim. Due to privacy reasons, KYoT
only includes the SC’s address. This data is hashed alongside
the identity SC address and the designation of a KYC claim
(claimType = 7). Finally, the hashed data is signed by
the KYoT. The signature is subsequently added to a Claim
object alongside the issuer’s Ethereum address and URL. The
entire addClaim method is encoded into an Application Binary
Interface (ABI), such that the identity SC can execute the
method. This represents the user by a proxy SC on the BC.
B. Device Registration
In order to register a device, KYoT extracts SRAM data
from the device, since it is used to construct a PUF for the
device’s verification. Devices are registered in the KYoT’s
database by the platform itself before the device owner re-
ceives her/his device. Next, s/he can register it on KYoT using
an identification number that was included with the device.
1 / / C r e a t e s a s i g n a t u r e from t h e c o n t r a c t ’ s a d d r e s s .
2 c o n s t d a t a = t h i s . web3 . u t i l s . a s c i i T o H e x (
3 [ r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s , ’ v e r i f i e d ’ ]
4 . j o i n ( ’ ’ )
5 ) ;
6 c o n s t hashedDa ta = t h i s . web3 . u t i l s . s o l i d i t y S h a 3 (
7 r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s , 7 , d a t a
8 ) ;
9 c o n s t s i g n a t u r e = a w a i t kydWeb3 . e t h . s i g n (
10 hashedData , e n v i r o n m e n t . w a l l e t A d d r e s s
11 ) ;
12 / / C r e a t e s a KYC c l a i m from t h e s i g n a t u r e .
13 c o n s t addClaimABI = r e s u l t . methods . addClaim (
14 7 , 1 , e n v i r o n m e n t . c o n t r a c t A d d r e s s ,
15 s i g n a t u r e , da t a , ’ h t t p s : / / www. a r d u i n o . cc / ’
16 ) . encodeABI ( ) ;
17 / / Adds t h e KYC c l a i m t o t h e i d e n t i t y s m a r t c o n t r a c t .
18 a w a i t r e s u l t . methods . e x e c u t e (
19 r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s , 0 , addClaimABI
20 ) . send ( {
21 gas : 4612388 , from : a c c o u n t s [ 0 ]
22 } ) ;
Listing 2. Signing a KYC Claim and Addition to the User’s Identity SC
C. Device Initialization
In cases where the KYoT is run by the manufacturer, the
device first is registered on the server before the device is sent
to the customer. KYoT generates a unique key using the PUF
and stores it without the user having any influence on this
process. When the user eventually wants to verify his device,
KYoT can compare the reproduced key derived from the new
SRAM data the user will provide to the original key stored in
the database by the manufacturer. The most crucial component
of the device initialization by the KYoT is, therefore, the
SRAM data extracted from the device. Due to the SRAM’s
bias toward 0 or 1, it is necessary for the device registration
to use a fuzzy extractor to generate a unique key from noisy
SRAM data, as well as a helper, which is needed in order to
reproduce the unique key in future verification processes. Here
the fuzzy-extractor Python library by [23] is deployed.
As pointed out in Sec. II, a proportion of the SRAM cells
have no bias toward 0 or 1 and their start-up value is entirely
random. This introduces noise into the SRAM reading, and
consequently, the raw SRAM data cannot be used as a unique
key. Therefore, KYoT error corrects the data first using a
fuzzy extractor as in [23]. To use the extractor, we create a
FuzzyExtractor object, defining the length of the input in bytes
as well as the number of noisy bits we want to allow for the
reproduction of the key. KYoT uses 32 Byte input strings to
optimize storage costs.
D. Device Registration by the Owner
To register a device the user creates an Ethereum account
and run the user registration process (cf. Section IV-A), which
consists of several steps. Firstly, the user fills in the device
registration form and assigns a device’s name to differentiate
between multiple devices registered. A unique identifier as
generated (cf. Section IV-C) and shipped with the device
when purchased is assigned. This device id is used as the
primary key during the creation on the database and enables
the retrieval later. This process enables the self sovereign
identity management of IoT devices by users as the owners.
Secondly, the identity SC is deployed to represent this
device on the BC. KYoT deploys the same base SC [2]
Identity.sol used for the user’s SC to the BC. Thirdly,
a user SC (cf. Section IV-A) is created and the user’s identity
is verified by adding a KYC claim to the SC. A claim key
is added, too, such that the user SC can issue claims. KYoT
utilizes this functionality to issue ownership claims to devices,
which effectively links devices to the user and leads to verified
instances of involved components represented on the BC, once
devices are also verified by a KYD claim (cf. Listing 3).
1 / / C r e a t e s a s i g n a t u r e f o r t h e d e v i c e i d .
2 c o n s t d a t a = t h i s . web3 . u t i l s . a s c i i T o H e x (
3 [ d e v i c e . v a l u e . id , ’ v e r i f i e d ’ ] . j o i n ( ’ ’ ) ) ;
4 c o n s t hashedDa ta = t h i s . web3 . u t i l s . s o l i d i t y S h a 3 (
5 r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s , 9 , d a t a ) ;
6 c o n s t s i g n a t u r e = a w a i t t h i s . web3 . e t h . s i g n (
7 hashedData , a c c o u n t s [ 0 ] ) ;
8 / / C r e a t e s an owner sh ip c l a i m from t h e s i g n a t u r e .
9 c o n s t u s e r = a w a i t t h i s . u s e r S e r v i c e . g e t ( ) ;
10 c o n s t addClaimABI = r e s u l t . methods . addClaim (
11 9 , 1 , u s e r . c o n t r a c t , s i g n a t u r e , da t a , ’ ’
12 ) . encodeABI ( ) ;
13 / / Adds t h e owner sh ip c l a i m t o t h e i d e n t i t y s m a r t
c o n t r a c t .
14 a w a i t r e s u l t . methods . e x e c u t e (
15 r e s u l t . o p t i o n s . a d d r e s s , 0 , addClaimABI ,
16 ) . send (
17 { gas : 4612388 , from : a c c o u n t s [ 0 ] } ) ;
Listing 3. Signing of an Ownership Claim and Adding it to the Device’s
Identity SC
KYoT uses the device’s unique identifier in the signed
message and indicates the claim to be an ownership claim
(claimType = 9). The steps of adding the claim differ only
in the information given on the issuer, since the user’s identity
SC will be given here and no URL is provided. Once these
transactions are executed, the device will be represented on
the BC by its proxy SC, which is also linked to the user’s
proxy SC through the ownership claim. In order to keep
track of which devices have been registered and belong to
which user, KYoT also updates the data stored in the device
table of the KYD database. Thus, the device registration form
along with the user’s account address and the identity SC’s
address deployed are sent to the KYD server through the user
registration endpoint of the REST API.
E. Device Verification
Devices registered by the user are shown on the main page,
where the user can view the device’s details. As long as the
device is not verified by KYoT (it does not have a signed KYD
claim added to its SC), it will be marked as “not verified". In
this case, a button to verify the device is also displayed. To
verify the device, the user will have to provide the SRAM data
collected from his device. Thus, the user will be directed to
detailed instructions of the process of obtaining the required
data to move forward through the following steps:
1) Setting up the Arduino create editor
2) Downloading the data extraction sketch
3) Uploading the sketch to the device
4) Copying the SRAM data from the serial monitor
Once the verification details are submitted, the PUF data are
sent to the KYD server alongside the device’s unique identifier.
F. Identity Smart SC
The identity SC is based on ERC 734 and ERC 735 (cf.
Section II-A). The implementation is an adjusted version of the
Fractal’s design [11], [19]. The implementation of the interface
handles keys on the SC and represents physical entities on the
BC. The ERC-based identity SCs facilitate the verification of
any claim, like identity claims. While the SCs implemented
are partially presented above, the source code are available at
[3] and the front-end as well as detailed specifications of the
KYoT source code are provided in [18].
V. DISCUSSION OF THE KYOT APPROACH
KYoT exploits SRAM-based PUFs for self-sovereign iden-
tity provision of IoT devices using SCs. Thus, discussions are
run with respect to security, privacy, and trust.
A. Security and Privacy
In an attack scenario, where a device owner wants to exploit
the system, it is challenging to keep the platform secure. E.g.,
the device owner can read out values of the entire SRAM
chip, and no matter what challenge is set, as long as it is
based on that SRAM, the user will know the correct response
even if he is registering an imposter device. This is due to
the principle of any SRAM-based PUF implementation. Such
problems mainly arise from device owners having physical
access to the device. With a straightforward implementation
of just asking the user to use the Arduino sketch to read out
the SRAM data, the device owner could return any value he
considers suitable, regardless of what the sketch emits.
While a preliminary solution splitting up the registration and
verification process among multiple actors, as done for KYoT,
helps, it is not sufficient to guard in full against a malicious
device owner. Further, device owners are verified by KYoT’s
KYC provider, since their BC representations are linked to
their real-world identities. Therefore, malicious device owners
can be held legally accountable. However, regulations are still
not fully clear in the context of BCs yet. Additionally, KYoT’s
security depends on the security of the MetaMask log-in.
Interactions with the BC, requiring the user to spent money,
always have to be approved through that MetaMask extension.
To address privacy concerns, no sensitive data is published
on the public BC by KYoT. Even though the retrieval of all
devices registered is achieved by filtering the device list by
the user’s account address, the only data stored on the KYD
platform being sensitive and not published on the BC is the
PUF key and the user’s registration data. The PUF key never
leaves the KYoT’s server. To protect user data collected via
the KYC processes, a preferably standalone, distributed, and
decoupled KYC system can protect access points better to
retrieve users’ data securely. The data added to signatures is
intentionally kept to a minimum and never includes any data
that could be regarded as sensitive. This way, only the platform
has access to the proof provided during the verification process
of any entity.
B. Blockchain Integration and Trust
Generally, BC-based systems are not intended to be de-
pendent on third parties to provide trust. In this regard,
the motivation for the integration of a BC in KYoT is to
remove the requirement of a trusted third party in payment
transactions. However, removing the requirement for trust in
KYoT would require the entire KYC and KYD process to
run on the BC. That way, the verification can be handled
by the protocol described in SCs and it is guaranteed to be
executed identically for each device through the consensus
mechanism of the BC. However, the verification process of
KYoT is computationally too complex to be run in a SC and
would result in high mining fees. Moreover, sensitive data
would have to be sent to the SC to verify a device, which
would be accessible to anyone violating privacy. Thus, the
need for trust in a third-party KYD platform remains.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This work presented the design and implementation of
KYoT, a multidimensional platform for a self-sovereign iden-
tification of IoT devices. KYoT utilizes the ERC 734 and
735 standards of the Ethereum BC for IoT identification.
Therefore, KYoT (a) enables trusted users on the BC to issue
KYD claims themselves and (b) includes an identity proxy
in the form of a SC. The generation of per-device unique
keys is achieved via an SRAM-based PUF. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, this is the first implementation combining
a PUF-based device identification with the issuing of ERC
734/735-based claims. Evaluation results indicate that trust
to device owners is unavoidable as far as a fully automated
and distributed key extraction mechanism is not available via
SRAM PUFs. Moreover, it is foreseeable that decoupling the
KYC part from KYoT enhances the user’s privacy even further.
Although more evaluations of KYoT in real world are
desirable, it can be concluded that SRAM-based PUFs and
their utilization in integration with identity standards have
proven by this prototypical implementation a viable approach.
It is highly recommended for a practical system in operation to
utilize (a) a stronger PUF design, which goes beyond SRAMs,
(b) periodical PUF generations without any user interactions,
and (c) a mechanism independent of devices’ power cycles.
The key remains in preventing malicious parties from pre-
dicting the PUF output, otherwise, it would be impossible to
ensure a fully secure authentication, since users have physical
access to their devices.
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